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-rw-r--r--system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch68
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 68 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c5486efa54..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa193-4.7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/PV: writes of %fs and %gs base MSRs require canonical addresses
-
-Commit c42494acb2 ("x86: fix FS/GS base handling when using the
-fsgsbase feature") replaced the use of wrmsr_safe() on these paths
-without recognizing that wr{f,g}sbase() use just wrmsrl() and that the
-WR{F,G}SBASE instructions also raise #GP for non-canonical input.
-
-Similarly arch_set_info_guest() needs to prevent non-canonical
-addresses from getting stored into state later to be loaded by context
-switch code. For consistency also check stack pointers and LDT base.
-DR0..3, otoh, already get properly checked in set_debugreg() (albeit
-we discard the error there).
-
-The SHADOW_GS_BASE check isn't strictly necessary, but I think we
-better avoid trying the WRMSR if we know it's going to fail.
-
-This is XSA-193.
-
-Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
-@@ -890,7 +890,13 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
- {
- if ( !compat )
- {
-- if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.eip) ||
-+ if ( !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.rip) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->user_regs.rsp) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->kernel_sp) ||
-+ (c.nat->ldt_ents && !is_canonical_address(c.nat->ldt_base)) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->fs_base) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->gs_base_kernel) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(c.nat->gs_base_user) ||
- !is_canonical_address(c.nat->event_callback_eip) ||
- !is_canonical_address(c.nat->syscall_callback_eip) ||
- !is_canonical_address(c.nat->failsafe_callback_eip) )
---- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
-@@ -2723,19 +2723,22 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
- switch ( regs->_ecx )
- {
- case MSR_FS_BASE:
-- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
- goto fail;
- wrfsbase(msr_content);
- v->arch.pv_vcpu.fs_base = msr_content;
- break;
- case MSR_GS_BASE:
-- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
- goto fail;
- wrgsbase(msr_content);
- v->arch.pv_vcpu.gs_base_kernel = msr_content;
- break;
- case MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE:
-- if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
-+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) ||
-+ !is_canonical_address(msr_content) )
- goto fail;
- if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE, msr_content) )
- goto fail;